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Abstract
I have suggested that one possible solution of the Boltzmann brain problem
is that the universe is decaying at an astronomical rate, making it likely to
decay within 20 billion years. A problem with this suggestion is that it seems
to require unnatural fine tuning in the decay mechanism that would not be
explained anthropically. Here it is pointed out that if a spacetime version of
volume averaging were used in the cosmological measure problem, this would
give anthropic support for an impending cosmic doomsday.
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Introduction
One of the main challenges of theoretical cosmology today is the measure problem
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56], how to get normalized probabilities for observations
in a universe that might simply be or have inflated to become arbitrarily large and
have arbitrarily many observers and observations. An acute aspect of the measure
problem is the question of how to show that observations are not dominated by
disordered Boltzmann brain observations, which would seem to swamp ordinary
observers if the universe lasts too long [57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68,
69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83]. I have suggested [60, 62, 67, 69]
that one possible solution of the Boltzmann brain problem would be for the universe
to be decaying at an astronomical rate, so that it would not be expected to last
more than 20 billion years from now. However, proposed mechanisms for this decay
[60, 62, 84] appears to require a high degree of fine tuning that seemed inexplicable.
In particular, past methods of conditioning upon the existence of observers do not
seem to help to explain this fine tuning, so it has not appeared to have an anthropic
explanation.
Here it is suggested that if the volume weighting that I proposed in [85] (see
also [86, 87, 88] for further discussion and motivation) is applied to the spacetime
4-volume of complete histories of the universe rather than to the spatial 3-volumes
of hypersurfaces of constant time as I have done previously, then the probabilities
of observations may be likely to be dominated by histories in which the lifetime is
not enormously greater than that within our observed past. This would then give
an anthropic argument in favor of universes that last only a finite time, thus mak-
ing more viable my previous proposed solution to the Boltzmann brain problem.
Furthermore, if the parameter that gives the astronomical decay rate is observation-
ally or experimentally accessible (e.g., if it were related to the cosmic parameter
w [60, 62] or a measurable property of the Higgs particle [84]), this prediction of
cosmic doomsday could be testable, so that in principle we could gain more direct
evidence that our universe is facing decay.
1 Previous arguments for and against astronom-
ical decay rates
Let me briefly summarize my arguments [60, 62, 67, 69] for and against a rapid or
astronomical decay rate of the universe, where by rapid or astronomical I mean on
the scale of the present age, so that the expected future lifetime would be of the
order of 1010 years or 1061 Planck times, rather than having an exponentially large
number in the exponent, such as one would get from the quantum recurrence time
e10
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for our apparently asymptotically de Sitter spacetime.
The basic argument for rapid decay is that it would solve the Boltzmann brain
(BB) problem. Without such decay, one can state the BB problem as follows [60,
2
62, 67, 69]:
Consider a finite comoving volume of an ever-expanding universe. Presumably
ordinary observers (OOs) depend upon free energy from stars and so die out when
stars do, giving a finite total number of OOs per comoving volume. However, de
Sitter thermal fluctuations, or even just vacuum quantum fluctuations, presumably
give some extremely tiny but positive probability per 4-volume for BBs to fluctuate
into existence and make observations. If the universe lasts for an infinite time, this
tiny rate multiplied by the infinite 4-volume will lead to an infinite number of BBs
per comoving volume, utterly swamping the finite number of OOs per comoving
volume.
This would apparently imply that statistically one would expect any random
observation to be a BB observation. However, BB observations are not expected to
have the order we observe for our observations, so our observations are not consistent
with being a random observation if nearly all observations are BB observations.
Therefore, making the plausible assumption that our observations are randomly
chosen from the set of all observations, statistically our ordered observations rule
out any scenario in which BBs swamp OOs, as would seemingly be the case in a
fixed comoving volume if the universe lasts forever and has only a finite time during
which OOs can exist.
To get a lower limit on the decay rate in the case that it is by the quantum
nucleation of a bubble, at annihilation probability A per 4-volume, that then expands
at nearly the speed of light [62, 69], one calculates that the minimum A to prevent
the expected future 4-volume of a comoving volume from being infinite is Amin =
9H4Λ/(4pi) = Λ
2/(4pi) ≈ (18 ± 2 Gyr)−4, where HΛ = H0
√
ΩΛ ≈ (16 ± 2 Gyr)−1 is
the asymptotic Hubble rate in the future de Sitter era if the presently observed dark
energy is indeed a cosmological constant (w ≡ p/ρ = −1). This would then imply
that the future half-life of our universe would be less than 19 Gyr.
There are various objections to the assumptions in this argument (e.g., especially
in [68, 89, 90, 71, 72, 73, 81, 91], but also more indirectly in papers cited later
in this paragraph). For example, in the picture of eternal inflation, new bubbles
continue to form arbitrarily far into the future and produce more OOs, so there
is not only a finite time during which OOs can exist. Then one has to choose
some regularization of the infinite numbers per comoving volume of both OOs and
BBs to make the OOs dominate, but proposals for doing this have been made
[63, 65, 66, 70, 74, 77, 80, 44, 49, 50, 83, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56]. However,
in this paper I do not wish to get into these difficult issues of eternal inflation but
rather focus on a problem raised within the context of my proposed solution with
its assumed rapid decay of the universe.
The problem within my proposal (mentioned within two of my papers on it
[62, 69]) is that if the annihilation or decay rate A is set by some microphysical
parameter, then it seems that such a parameter must be fine tuned in a way that
is not explained, even anthropically. For example, I considered the possibility [25]
that the decay rate is set by the gravitino mass, which I then found [62, 69] had to
be set to within a relative uncertainty of less than about 0.006.
Nima Arkani-Hamed, Sergei Dubovsky, Leonardo Senatore, and Giovanni Vil-
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ladoro [84] have pointed out an interesting alternative decay mechanism for realizing
the cosmic decay I predicted that would involve parameters of Higgs physics that in
principle could be measured in the foreseeable future (unlike the nearly 1018 GeV
gravitino mass needed for it to give suitable decay rates). However, again there
would have to be fine tuning, as the Higgs mass would need to be in a certain
0.1 GeV window depending upon the top mass and the strong interaction coupling
constant. (See also [92] for a further discussion of this decay mechanism.)
One might note that other parameters of physics seem to be fine tuned, most
dramatically the cosmological constant to zero within roughly one part in 10122 of
the Planck value. However, it is plausible that most of these other fine tunings can
be explained anthropically. One could presumably explain an upper limit on the
decay rate A anthropically from the requirement that the universe last long enough
to produce ordinary observers in solar systems that take a long time to form, say
[62, 69] Amax ∼ 1000Amin in terms of the value of Amin given above, but before the
ideas to be presented below, I could see no similar anthropic reason to explain a
lower limit on A, since ordinary observers presumably could exist no matter low the
decay rate is.
Furthermore, even if it turned out that the decay rate in our part of the multiverse
is within the range Amin ≤ A ≤ Amax, it would still leave it mysterious why one does
not have A < Amin in some other part of the multiverse that also allows Boltzmann
brains [62, 69]. If indeed there are other parts with A < Amin (with Amin equal to the
value of Λ2/(4pi) in that part of the multiverse), then it would seem that that part
would have an infinite number of Boltzmann brains that would swamp the ordinary
observers in our part. In other words, we need to prevent BBs from dominating
OOs over the entire multiverse, and not just in our part, so just having Amin ≤ A
in our part alone would not be sufficient.
2 Rapid universe decay supported by 4-volume
averaging
The new idea of this paper is that if the volume averaging I proposed and discussed in
[85, 86, 87, 88] is taken to be 4-volume averaging rather than the 3-volume averaging
originally advocated there, this might select mainly histories of the universe that do
not last long enough for Boltzmann brains to become a problem.
Traditionally many of us have believed that after weighting each component of
the quantum state by absolute square of its amplitude, for calculating the proba-
bilities of observations, one should also weight by the number of observers in that
component. For example, this is done explicitly in [9, 41, 43] and at least implicitly
by several proponents of eternal inflation [93, 94, 95, 96]. For a constant density
of observers, this effectively weights the quantum components by their volumes as
well as by the squares of their amplitudes, so I have called this volume weighting
[85, 86, 87, 88].
However, for an eternally expanding universe in which Boltzmann brains form
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at a positive (even if extremely tiny) rate per 4-volume, volume weighting leads
to domination by the components of the quantum state (say eigenstates of the
spatial geometry, as in canonical quantum gravity) with arbitrarily large volume
and hence arbitrarily large numbers of observers in the form of Boltzmann brains.
Therefore, I proposed what I called volume averaging [85, 86, 87, 88], weighting
each quantum component not by the total number of observers, but by the spatial
density of observers. (This would be what one would get if one imagined choosing a
random observation by sampling one random region of space, of fixed size, for each
component of the quantum state, rather than sampling in each component a different
number of regions proportional to the volume, which would give volume weighting.)
This volume averaging then would count components of the quantum state at very
late times and with very large volumes and numbers of Boltzmann brains as each
having very low weight in comparison with components corresponding the present
much smaller size in which the spatial density of observers is much higher from the
existence of ordinary observers.
Nevertheless, there remained a problem [85] in that although the contribution
from each component of the quantum state at huge volume (with negligible ordinary
observers there) is very small in comparison with those of 3-geometries corresponding
to the present universe with its much higher density of observers (almost entirely
ordinary observers), if the universe expands forever, there will be infinitely more
components of large size than those corresponding to the present universe. The
ratio depends on how one does the integral over the time in counting the different
components that in canonical quantum gravity correspond to different times, but if
one takes the most natural prescription [97], one gets a weighting proportional to
the proper time in the semiclassical limit, so then with an infinite amount of proper
time to integrate over for an infinitely expanding universe, the total contribution
of all of the infinitely many times of very large components with the Boltzmann
brains would dominate over the finite times of the small components with ordinary
observers. Thus the infinite integral over time would cause the Boltzmann brains
to dominate in the final result and make our observations of order statistically
extremely improbable.
The new idea here is to do the volume averaging over the entire 4-volume of each
history of the universe given by the quantum state, so that one weights each compo-
nent of the state by the number of observers per 4-volume instead of per 3-volume
on components of fixed 3-geometry. In canonical quantum gravity the quantum
state may be represented by a wavefunctional over 3-geometries and matter field
configurations on each 3-geometry, so I do have my doubts whether it makes sense
to interpret a quantum state of the universe as giving amplitudes or probabilities
for 4-geometries (histories of 3-geometries) rather than just for 3-geometries them-
selves. Thus I do have the fear that what I am proposing here may be nonsense, but
since it is rather unclear what to do in quantum gravity, let us here suppose that
it makes sense for a quantum state to give a quantum probability distribution over
4-geometries.
Indeed such a proposal of getting probabilities for 4-geometries (histories) rather
than for 3-geometries (configurations) has been made within the decoherent-histories
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approach [98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113,
114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119], within which one can define probabilities for coarse-
grained histories within a decoherent set. This approach is plagued by the ambiguity
of which decoherent set to take (see particularly [102, 108, 110, 111]), since generally
there are large families of them, so that I have admittedly been sceptical that this is
the correct approach to take, but here for the sake of argument let us suppose that
one can indeed use the quantum state of the universe to get a quantum probability
for each member of a set of histories or 4-geometries.
So far, this probability distribution does not directly give the probability of
observations, since one needs to know the distribution of observations within each
history and how to weight them [55], which is the classical analogue (within the
set of histories interpreted as being classical 4-geometries) of the failure of Born’s
rule in cosmology [86, 87, 88]. This weighting of course is a weighting beyond the
quantum weighting assigned to each history by the quantum state, which only gives
a probability for each history and not the probability for each observation within
the history. (E.g., within a single history, one might want to weight an observation
that occurs twice by twice the weight of an observation that occurs just once, and
indeed I shall do that here.)
Here I am proposing that if one can indeed, from the quantum state of the
universe, get a probability distribution over 4-geometries (including the internal
spacetime history of the non-gravitational fields within each 4-geometry, though for
short I shall sometimes refer to the entire history of all the fields as a 4-geometry),
for observational probabilities (the probabilities of observational results, called ob-
servations for short), one should further weight by the density of observations on
a 4-volume basis. That is, take the probability of each possible observation as be-
ing proportional to the sum, over all histories, of the quantum probability of that
history multiplied by the number of times the particular observation occurs within
that history and divided by the total 4-volume of that history.
In the end one wants normalized probabilities of observations Oj in a theory Ti
(which should in this scheme specify the quantum state, the rule for getting the
probabilities of the histories from that quantum state [say by some particular choice
of a set of decohering histories], and the rule for getting observational probabilities
from that distribution of histories [here assumed to be by 4-volume averaging],
Pj(i) ≡ P (Oj|Ti) with
∑
j
Pj(i) = 1. (1)
For this, one needs to divide each unnormalized observational probability pj(i) by
the sum of all the unnormalized probabilities.
Thus the formula for observational probabilities in 4-volume averaging would be
Pj(i) =
pj(i)∑
k>0 pk
, (2)
where each unnormalized observational probability would be
pj(i) =
∑
h
P (h|i)N(j|h)
V4(h)
. (3)
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Here P (h|i) is the quantum probability that the quantum state given by the theory
Ti results in the history h, N(j|h) is the number of times the particular observation
Oj occurs within the history h, and V4(h) is the 4-volume of the history h. For
ease of exposition, I am taking the set of histories h to be discrete, so that one
simply has a sum over them of the quantum probability of the history multiplied by
the 4-volume density of the observation Oj, but of course one could take the set of
histories to be continuous and replace the sum over h by an integral.
Now suppose that one considers two possible histories of the universe, h = 1
in which the universe expands for a very, very long time as an asymptotically de
Sitter spacetime, and h = 2 in which it is like our present universe up to the
present, say 14 Gyr after the beginning, and then totally decays after twice this
time, with a total lifetime of, say, 28 Gyr. In history 1, in which the universe lasts
long enough for Boltzmann brains in the late phase to dominate over the ordinary
observers that last for only a finite time, N(j|h)/V4(h) is approximately given by
the 4-volume density of Boltzmann brains, which is very roughly the exponential of
the negative of the action to produce one, perhaps e−10
42
[64] (maybe the right order
of magnitude for the exponent of the exponent). On the other hand, in history 2
most observers are presumably ordinary observers, and the 4-volume density would
be much higher, perhaps something of the crude order of e−536 in Planck units
(maybe the right order of magnitude for the exponent itself) if one took, say, 1011
human observers in a 4-volume corresponding to a hypercube of length 14 billion
light years or approximately 1061 Planck lengths, which is an enormously larger 4-
density. Therefore, unless the quantum probability of history 1 were greater than the
quantum probability of history 2 by this ratio, say P (h = 1|i)/P (h = 2|i) > e1042 ,
history 2 would contribute more to the observational probabilities and give the
prediction that most observations would be by ordinary observers rather than by
Boltzmann brains, in this 4-volume averaging.
This result implies that unless the quantum probabilities of very long histories
are enormously greater than those of histories that last only of the order of the
lifetime of the existence of the set of ordinary observers, the observational proba-
bilities will be dominated by the shorter histories if 4-volume averaging is correct.
This would mean that even if one needed a fine tuning of one part in several hun-
dred to set some microphysical parameter (e.g, the gravitino mass or the Higgs
mass, as discussed above), if the multiverse included these possibilities and if the
quantum probabilities were not minuscule for histories with the property that they
would decay on astronomical decay times, then such histories would dominate for
observational probabilities, solving the Boltzmann brain problem.
Besides the possibility of producing an astronomically short history by bubble
decay, one might also produce it by having the dark energy or quintessence being
a scalar field on a nonflat potential that drops below zero, as discussed in [60].
Then, although we may be presently on a part of the potential that is positive,
giving the currently observed acceleration of the universe, as the scalar field slowly
slides down the very gradual potential slope, the potential would eventually go
negative, leading to the universe ending in a big crunch. For this to be consistent
with present observations of the ratio w of the pressure to the energy density of
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the dark energy, −1.14 < w << −0.88 from WMAP, baryon acoustic oscillations,
and Type 1a supernovae data for a constant w [121], the slope of the potential
would have to be extremely small in Planck units, which would apparently require
very fine tuning that did not have a previous anthropic explanation. However, with
4-volume weighting, this fine tuning would be explained anthropically if it were
the mechanism to keep the 4-volume small enough that the 4-volume density of
observers is not nearly so low as it would be asymptotically from Boltzmann brains
for an extremely long lasting universe.
Of course, even if our universe history were most probably astronomically short
(not enormously longer than its present age or the asymptotic Hubble time from the
present value of the dark energy, after conditioning upon the existence of observa-
tions), one would still like a prediction as to what decay mechanism is most likely to
produce this. For example, is it by bubble nucleation, and if so, what microphysical
process leads to that? On the other hand, is it by sliding down the potential for a
scalar quintessence, and if so, what is the expected probability distribution for the
present value of w? Without having a more detailed prediction of the landscape of
possibilities and of their quantum probabilities in the multiverse, it appears difficult
to answer such questions. However, it would be interesting to attempt to answer
them, particularly for predicting whether there is likely to be any observational
consequence (before the universe actually decays!) of an impending decay. For ex-
ample, is it actually likely that we could get a confirmation of the present prediction
of decay from the value of the Higgs mass and other microphysical parameters that
could be measured at CERN [84, 92]?
3 Challenges for 4-volume averaging
4-volume averaging may solve the Boltzmann brain problem by having observational
probabilities dominated by histories of the universe (4-geometries with their matter
fields) that do not last long enough for significant Boltzmann brain production.
Furthermore, it may do so by a decay mechanism that leads to other observable
consequences (e.g., the Higgs mass within a certain range [84, 92] or else a w > −1).
It would be very exciting to confirm any of these consequences of the prediction.
However, I should also caution that 4-volume weighting is just one possibility
among many others that I have discussed [85, 86, 87, 88], and it does have challenges
facing it. I personally think it is very important to analyze further, but at present
I am still rather sceptical that it is right.
My main theoretical scepticism is that normally quantum theory gives ampli-
tudes and expectation values (some of which may be interpreted as probabilities)
for configurations or for observables, but not for directly for histories. There is
the program for calculating probabilities for members of sets of decohering histories
[98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115,
116, 117, 118, 119], but so far it has always struck me as rather ad hoc which set
of decoherent histories to choose for assigning probabilities to members of that set.
So personally I have not been ready to adopt this program myself, but if it leads
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to a better solution of the Boltzmann brain problem than others and also leads to
possibly testable predictions, as using 4-volume weighting within it seems to do,
then it would certainly be worth considering. If so, the main challenge or mystery
in my eyes would be what it is that specifies the choice of the set of decohering
histories that should be assigned the quantum probabilities.
If one does accept the difficult idea that histories have quantum probabilities
(and not just amplitudes in a path integral or sum over histories) and tentatively
accepts the idea of 4-volume weighting to convert the quantum probabilities of entire
histories to observational probabilities (the probabilities of individual observational
results, of which there can be many of varying frequency within each history), there
are still an observational challenge facing the present proposal. This challenge is
that if one accepts the anthropic multiverse explanation of the observed cosmic
acceleration or effective cosmological constant, with 4-volume weighting it would
seem more natural for it to come out as a slightly negative minimum in a potential,
so that the universe would evolve into a big crunch directly, without require any
bubble formation or slow rolling of a quintessence scalar field down a gentle slope
to get to negative values.
If one assumed that for some unknown reason the present value of the poten-
tial had to be positive, one might justify astronomically rapid bubble nucleation
or a slight tilt to the potential to cause the universe to decay quickly and make
the 4-volume of our history small enough for ordinary observers to dominate over
Boltzmann brains. That is, the enormously extra observational weights in Eq. (3)
from the N(j|h)/V4(h) factors would dominate over the greatly reduced quantum
probabilities P (h|i) for the histories with the fine tunings for the bubble nucleation
rate or for the slight tilt to the quintessence scalar potential. However, so far as I
know, there is no known reason why the observed cosmological constant had to come
out positive rather than negative. If a landscape of possibilities (e.g., from string/M
theory) can predict a minimum near zero to be consistent with our observations that
it is about 122 orders of magnitude smaller than the Planck density, then there is
no reason obvious to me why this minimum should have one sign or the other, that
is, why the quantum probabilities for histories should very strongly prefer one sign
over the other for values near zero.
If one had a history with a negative minimum for the quintessence scalar poten-
tial, the scalar could just sit there without any fine tuning and produce a short-lived
universe after the energy density of the other matter fields dropped low enough for
the effective negative cosmological constant to dominate and lead to a big crunch.
Therefore, if 4-volume weighting were correct, it seems mysterious why we have not
observed a negative cosmological constant. (If I had been writing this paper be-
fore the discovery of the sign of the effective cosmological constant, I would have
predicted that 4-volume weighting would most likely lead to an observed effective
cosmological constant that is negative.)
I do not presently see how to meet this challenge (or the one of how to specify
a particular set of decohering histories so that one can really get probabilities for
4-geometries rather than just for 3-geometries), so the present proposal is certainly
incomplete. Perhaps there is some yet-to-be-discovered reason why having decay by
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bubble nucleation or by a tilt to the quintessence scalar potential does not have a
quantum probability much lower than simply having a slightly negative potential
minimum for the quintessence scalar to sit in.
4 Conclusions
If quantum theory really can give probabilities for 4-geometries (spacetime histories)
rather than just for 3-geometries (spatial configurations), then 4-volume weighting
would be a rather natural way of extracting probabilities of observational results, by
weighting each history’s contribution to the probability of a specific observation not
only by the quantum probability of that history but also by the 4-volume density of
that observation within the history. 4-volume weighting appears to predict that the
universe should not last enormously longer than the lifetime of the set of ordinary
observers, so it would give a simple solution of the Boltzmann brain problem. De-
pending upon the decay mechanism of our history, 4-volume weighting might lead to
predictions that the Higgs mass is in a very narrow range [84, 92] or to predictions
that w > −1, which would be very interesting to test.
On the other hand, I myself do not understand how to get unique quantum prob-
abilities for 4-geometries rather than for 3-geometries, and I also do not understand
how 4-volume weighting should not have led to the prediction that the observed
value of the cosmological constant would be negative. Therefore, the proposal and
its predictions are certainly not complete. However, since the possible consequences
of 4-volume averaging are so interesting, I am putting it out for consideration in
the hopes that others can help see whether it can meet the challenges facing it and
indeed make important predictions for the fate of our universe.
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